AXELAR · L1 · QRI 15 · BAND 2 Acknowledged Hybrid FAIL · Stage 0 · Washing 1x

Axelar is the cross-chain bridge that signs attestations for 60-plus destination chains using threshold ECDSA. If Shor breaks the TSS key, the downstream chains do not learn about it, they just accept the forged message. Bridge risk is not usually cryptographic. On Axelar, it is.

inLinkedIn XPost ▼Scorecard JSON ⇆Compare Verified 2026-04-18

Summary

Axelar is a cross-chain bridge using CometBFT Ed25519 consensus and TSS ECDSA for cross-chain attestations. Systemic quantum risk: broken threshold signatures would allow forged attestations across all 60+ destination chains. No PQC roadmap. TSS-PQC is an open research problem — no production-grade protocols exist.

What the gates say

Hybrid: FAIL. No hybrid plan on file.
Evidence: PASS. Sources reconstructable by third party.
Primitive naming: PASS. Named primitives at every scored sub-level.

Burn-vs-rescue policy on file

undeclared

Seven dimensions

Each dimension scores 0-100 internally; the weighted roll-up produces the QRI on the left. Open a row to read the sub-score detail.

1 Cryptographic Exposure 28 / 100

1a_primitive_inventory 12 / 20

Threshold signatures for cross-chain bridging is defining feature.

Primitives: Ed25519 (CometBFT consensus) · ECDSA secp256k1 (Cosmos SDK accounts) · TSS / threshold ECDSA (cross-chain attestations) · SHA-256

Evidence: genfinity.io

1b_shor_grover_pq_tag 12 / 20

Evidence: axelar.network

1c_algorithm_family_diversity 0 / 20

No PQC families

1d_nist_security_category 0 / 20

No NIST PQC

1e_implementation_quality 4 / 20

Evidence: marcohextor.com

2 HNDL Exposure 25 / 100

2a_active_key_exposure 6 / 20

75 validators, threshold signing keys persistent. Cross-chain attestations exposed.

2b_cold_key_exposure 6 / 20

Mainnet since 2022. Modest cold exposure.

2c_signature_longterm_validity 6 / 20

TSS ECDSA sigs for cross-chain attestations forgeable post-Shor — downstream chains would accept forged 'Axelar' attestations.

2d_encryption_confidentiality 7 / 20

Standard TLS; TSS protocol uses x25519 — Shor-vulnerable.

3 Metadata & Privacy Exposure 22 / 100

3a_tx_graph_visibility 5 / 20

Pseudonymous cross-chain messages publicly visible.

3b_rpc_mempool_concentration 5 / 20

Cosmos RPC concentration.

3c_cross_chain_bridge_correlation 6 / 20

Axelar itself is the bridge layer; all flows visible to passive observer.

3d_retroactive_deanon_risk 6 / 20

TSS ECDSA broken post-Shor means attacker can forge historical attestations for all 60+ chains Axelar bridges to.

4 Migration Architecture 40 / 100

4a_crypto_agility 10 / 20

Cosmos SDK supports adding sig types via module. TSS migration non-trivial (coordinate across 75 validators + 60+ destination chains).

4b_account_abstraction_key_rotation 8 / 20

Standard Cosmos AuthZ/multisig.

4c_hard_fork_track_record 12 / 20

Smooth Cosmos SDK upgrades. Cross-chain halt vulnerability handled via responsible disclosure.

4d_hybrid_deployment_readiness 10 / 20

Hybrid threshold signing (classical ECDSA + PQC) would require protocol-level redesign — architecturally possible but substantial.

5 Deployment Execution 2 / 100

5a_mainnet_pqc_pct 0 / 20

no public artifact found

5b_pqc_code_in_client 0 / 20

no PQC in Axelar Core

5c_validator_pqc_adoption 0 / 20

75 validators, no PQC TSS keys

5d_published_milestones_count 0 / 20

no PQC milestones

5e_pqc_washing_delta 2 / 20

No PQC announcements

6 Supply Chain Vendor Readiness 5 / 100

6a_wallet 2 / 20

6b_bridge 1 / 20

6c_custodian 1 / 20

6d_rpc_hsm 1 / 20

7 Governance & Coordination 45 / 100

7a_validator_stake_distribution 10 / 20

75 validators, top 10 ~40%.

7b_upgrade_cadence_under_pressure 12 / 20

Cross-chain halt vulnerability handled; Cosmos SDK upgrades smooth.

7c_named_coordination_lead 13 / 20

Axelar Foundation + Interop Labs (Sergey Gorbunov, Georgios Vlachos).

7d_adversarial_coordination_precedent 10 / 20

Responsible disclosure + fix demonstrates security coordination capability.

The X + Y vs Z inequality

X (data shelf life): 10+ (cross-chain attestations valid for long periods; TSS keys are long-lived)

Y (migration time): 10-15

Z10 (10% CRQC year): 2036 · Z50 (50%): 2041

Verdict: X+Y > Z (danger).

Four-scenario grid

Scenario	Value preserved	Privacy preserved
quantum never	100%	100%
arrives suddenly pre migration	10%	5%
arrives slowly post migration	75%	65%
arrives slowly mid migration	40%	25%

Peers in the L1 profile

Order-book view of the 9 chains closest to Axelar by QRI.

Public artifacts used for this scorecard

Each entry below is a sub-score citation. Clicking the link takes you to the public source. A third party should be able to reconstruct every number on this page from these URLs in 48 hours.

Cryptographic Exposure · 1a_primitive_inventory

Threshold signatures for cross-chain bridging is defining feature.

https://genfinity.io/2025/09/17/axelar-network-deep-dive-2025/

Cryptographic Exposure · 1b_shor_grover_pq_tag

https://axelar.network

Cryptographic Exposure · 1e_implementation_quality

https://marcohextor.com/axelar-network-cross-chain-halt-vulnerability/

Supply chain snapshot

wallet Keplr · Leap · Ledger HW 0 PQC roadmaps

bridge Axelar (self) · Wormhole · LayerZero 0 PQC roadmaps

custodian Coinbase Custody · BitGo · Fireblocks 0 PQC roadmaps

rpc_hsm Polkachu · BlockPi · Axelar RPC 0 PQC roadmaps

A chain's supply chain cannot migrate faster than its slowest dependency. Zero PQC roadmaps in any of the four categories is a structural blocker, not a lagging indicator.

Analyst notes on the scoring

Axelar's role as bridge amplifies risk — every downstream chain relies on its TSS security. TSS + PQC is significantly harder than straight-sig PQC (fewer NIST-ready protocols). Band 2 Acknowledged.

Scorecard metadata

Profile: L1
Scored: 2026-04-18 by layerqu-v2-scoring-agent-1
v1 reference: chainscreen-v1-archive
QRI raw: 15 · after caps: 15
Confidence interval: ±15
PQC washing ratio: 1x
Burn-vs-rescue: undeclared

Caps triggered

mosca_cap_60
sutor_stage_cap_2
casado_stage_cap_3
preskill_half_dim2_dim3_dim5_dim6
hybrid_gate_fail_cap_60